This morning, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued Standing Order No. 2 Concerning COVID-19 Precautionary Measures.  Pursuant to Standing Order No. 2, all Chancery hearings and trials will be conducted only telephonically for the next 30 days, absent a party requesting an in-person hearing and demonstrating imminent irreparable harm.

Standing Order No. 2 replaces the Court of Chancery’s original standing order in its entirety, which was issued last week.

A full list of the orders and related press releases can be found on the Delaware Judiciary’s website, which is also summarized in yesterday’s blog post. 

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  Carl is admitted in the State of Delaware and regularly practices before the Delaware Court of Chancery, with an emphasis on shareholder disputes. You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

In light of the outbreak of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), the Courts of the State of Delaware have issued various standing orders to institute precautionary methods in dealing with this worldwide pandemic.   A full list of the orders and related press releases can be found on the Delaware Judiciary’s website.

A summary of the orders and press releases issued by each Delaware State Court is set forth below:

Delaware Supreme Court

  • Issued an Order dated March 13, 2020 declaring a Judicial Emergency, which will go into effect on Monday, March 16 at 8:00 a.m. ET.
  • Pursuant to the Order, the declaration gives all trial courts in Delaware the flexibility to continue trials and hearings in civil and criminal cases for 30 days.
  • The declaration will also limit the number of people gathering in public court buildings.
  • During the period of judicial emergency, all time requirements under the Speedy Trial Guidelines are tolled.
  • See Press Release, Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Declares Judicial Emergency, dated March 14, 2020.

Delaware Court of Chancery

  • The Court of Chancery issued a Standing Order Concerning COVID-19 Precautionary Measures.
  • The Order permits court proceedings to be held telephonically when practical and efficient.
  • Where a telephonic hearing is not feasible (i.e. a trial),  and involves the presence of a person who (i) may be infected with COVID-19, or (ii) has been in the presence of a person who may be infected within the past 14 days, the parties shall meet and confer and notify the Court of any agreement or disagreement on how to proceed.  Parties should consider the use of videoconferencing, whether an alternative person is available, and whether a continuance is appropriate.

Delaware Superior Court

  • Today, the Delaware Superior Court issued Standing Order No. 2, which, among other things, suspends all civil and criminal trials through April 15, 2020.
  • Issued Standing Order No. 1, which, like the Court of Chancery’s Standing Order, permits hearings to be held telephonically, and sets procedures for in-person hearings such as trials that would involve  the presence of an individual who may be infected with COVID-19, or has been in the presence of an individual who may be infected within the past 14 days.

The Court of Common Pleas and Justice of the Peace Courts have likewise issued similar standing orders in response to the coronavirus.  Stay tuned for further updates from the Delaware Courts in response to this worldwide pandemic.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  Carl is admitted in the State of Delaware and regularly practices before the Delaware Court of Chancery, with an emphasis on shareholder disputes. You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

In the recent decision handed down by Chancellor Bouchard in the case of In re NantHealth, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, Lead C.A. No. 2018-0302-AGB (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 2020), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss filed by the director defendants of NantHealth, Inc.

In this consolidated lawsuit, several NantHealth investors asserted that Patrick Soon-Shiong, a South African billionaire who invented the cancer fighting drug Abraxane, and two former executives and four directors, misled the public regarding a research deal with the University of Utah.

Specifically, according to the amended complaint, Soon-Shiong caused certain nonprofits controlled by him to make a donation to the University of Utah with the undisclosed understanding that the University would be required to pay substantially those funds to NantHealth to use its technology.  As NantHealth’s controlling stockholder, plaintiffs alleged that Soon-Shiong stood to benefit  to make it appear as if a prestigious academic institution had independently endorsed NantHealth’s technology and that there was greater commercial demand for its products than in reality.  Plaintiffs asserted claims of breach of fiduciary duty, corporate waste, and unjust enrichment against defendants.

Chancellor Bouchard denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the breach of fiduciary duty claim against Soon-Shiong for failure to allege demand futility, holding that a “constellation of facts” had been adequately pled creating a reasonable doubt about certain directors’ independence from Soon-Shiong such that a majority of the board could not have impartially considered a demand against Soon-Shiong.  The remaining defendants, however, were dismissed given that the amended complaint failed to allege demand futility separately as to them.

In addition, the Court of Chancery dismissed the unjust enrichment claims against all defendants.  Chancellor Bouchard found that the conduct underlying the amended complaint, such as making false and misleading disclosures, was not related to the defendants’ receipt of money from the company.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  Carl is admitted in the State of Delaware and regularly practices before the Delaware Court of Chancery, with an emphasis on shareholder disputes. You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

In one of the more lengthy decisions issued in a books and records case commenced under 8 Del. C. § 220, Lebanon County Employees’ Retirement Fund, et al. v. AmerisourceBergen Corporation, Vice Chancellor Laster ordered  AmerisourceBergen Corporation (“AmerisourceBergen” or the “Company”) to make available for inspection board-level documents formally evidencing the directors’ deliberations and decisions and the materials that the directors formally received and considered (the “Formal Board Materials”) relating to whether AmerisourceBergen engaged in wrongdoing in connection with the distribution of opioids.  C.A. No. 2019-0527-JTL (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2020)

As the 63-page opinion notes, two congressional investigations concluded that AmerisourceBergen, one of the world’s largest wholesale distributors of opioid pain medication, failed to identify and address suspicious orders of opioids, in violation of federal law requirements.  Slip op. at 1.  The opinion further notes that  the Company is subject to multiple subpoenas, government investigations, and lawsuits, and is the defendant in multi-district litigation brought by cities, counties, and attorney generals of virtually every state.  Id.

In opposing the books and records demand, AmerisourceBergen took the position that plaintiffs lacked a proper purpose, and in the alternative, the scope of the requested inspection was overly broad.  More specifically, the Company argued that plaintiffs needed to not only demonstrate an acceptable purpose, but also had to provide indications of their intended use of the materials in the demand letter itself.  Against this backdrop, AmerisourceBergen argued that plaintiff’s purpose, as set forth in the demand, should be limited to commencing a Caremark claim (which are notoriously difficult to prove).

The Court of Chancery disagreed, noting that AmerisourceBergen’s position ran contrary to Delaware Supreme Court case law, which has held that the fruits of an investigation of wrongdoing could include non-litigation purposes, including to “seek an audience with the board to discuss proposed reforms, or failing in that, [to] prepare a stockholder resolution for the next annual meeting, or [to] mount a proxy fight to elect new directors.”  Slip op. at 24 (quoting  Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 806 A.2d at 113, 117 (Del. 2002), and citing Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 121 (Del. 2006) and White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 557 n.54 (Del. 2001) for their identification of other potential non-litigation purposes for books and records resulting from an investigation of corporate wrongdoing).

To summarize Vice Chancellor Laster’s disagreement with the Company’s position:

“AmerisourceBergen’s approach would require a stockholder to commit in advance to what it will do with an investigation before seeing the results of the investigation.  An investigator who proclaimed the outcome of an investigation at the outset would be viewed as biased. . . . We would not want a prosecutor to commit to bringing charges before learning whether the evidence supported them.”

Accordingly, the Court permitted inspection of the Formal Board Materials.  Further, in light of the Company’s refusal to provide discovery into what types of books and records exist, the Court authorized plaintiffs to conduct a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition to determine whether other relevant information exists.

Key Takeaway: This decision is significant because it clarifies that a plaintiff stockholder need not commit to bringing litigation in the demand letter before receiving the results of the inspection.  A defendant corporation opposing the inspection of its books and records that may support a potential Caremark claim will need to take note that raising merits-based challenges to a Caremark lawsuit it expects the plaintiff to file will not alone suffice to defend a Section 220 claim to investigate corporate misconduct.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  Carl is admitted in the State of Delaware and regularly practices before the Delaware Court of Chancery, with an emphasis on shareholder disputes. You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

The Delaware Senate recently confirmed Governor John Carney’s nominees to serve as the Chief Justice and Associate Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court.  In October of 2019, former Associate Justice Collins Seitz, Jr. was nominated by the Governor to replace Leo. E. Strine, Jr. as the Chief Justice,  in light of the latter’s retirement.  Tamika Montgomery-Reeves, who previously served as a Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery since 2015, was nominated to replace Seitz’s seat as an Associate Justice, making her the first African American to serve on the Delaware Supreme Court.  The State Senate voted unanimously to confirm the two nominees to the High Court.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  Carl is admitted in the State of Delaware and regularly practices before the Delaware Court of Chancery, with an emphasis on shareholder disputes. You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

In the recent decision of Kosinski v. GGP, Inc., C.A. No. 2018-0540-KSJM (Del. Ch. Aug. 29, 2019), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a stockholder’s books and records demand under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) to inspect the books and records of defendant GGP Inc. (“GGP”) in order to investigate potential mismanagement in connection with the merger of defendant corporation.

Through the merger, GGP, a real estate company, was acquired by another real estate company owning roughly one-third of GGP’s common stock.  Plaintiff asserted the buyer was GGP’s de facto controlling shareholder, and that the procedural protections required pursuant to Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (“MFW”) for deferential review of a merger process involving a controller had not been adequately implemented.

GGP argued that plaintiff’s stated purposes were generated by his lawyer, and were not his own, because plaintiff originally retained counsel in order to challenge the merger, not to inspect the company’s books and records.  The Court rejected this argument (distinguishing Wilkinson v. A. Schulman Inc., 2017 WL 5289553 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2017), summarized here), and held that plaintiff’s deposition demonstrated that he was motivated to inspect the documents, and was apprised of the demand contents along with the circumstances of the merger.

GGP also argued that plaintiff’s stated purposes for inspection were improper.  Plaintiff sought books and records: (i) to investigate potential breaches of fiduciary duty and director disinterestedness in connection with the merger and (ii) to obtain corporate records to value his shares.  As to the former purpose,  although GGP had established a special committee to negotiate the merger, the Court found that plaintiff pointed to facts suggesting that the special committee failed to obtain a fair price and that its members potentially were interested or lacked independence.   As to the latter, the Court held that plaintiff may seek corporate records to further inform his valuation of his stock at the time of the merger, even though plaintiff already had some information concerning value.

The Court granted plaintiff’s Section 220 demand, holding that where procedural protections are absent, the transaction may not have been at arm’s length, and finding that plaintiff had demonstrated facts that established a “credible basis” to investigate potential breaches of fiduciary duty.

Key Takeaway

In granting the Section 220 demand, the Court nonetheless noted that it was making an “exceptionally modest point” and not announcing a rule that noncompliance with MFW procedural protections “automatically supplies a credible basis.”   Slip op. at 17. In other words, plaintiff stockholders seeking inspection of corporate books and records may need to do more than simply show the company’s failure to comply with the procedural protections under Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  Carl is admitted in the State of Delaware and regularly practices before the Delaware Court of Chancery, with an emphasis on shareholder disputes. You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

In the recent decision of Tiger v. Boast Apparel, Inc., No. 23, 2019 (Del. Aug. 7, 2019), the Delaware Supreme Court held that conditioning the inspection of documents pursuant to a demand under 8 Del. C. § 220 on the demanding party entering into a confidentiality agreement should be viewed as the exception, not the rule, and that the corporation must provide justification for confidentiality in order for such a condition to be upheld by the Court.

As stated by the Delaware High Court:

We hold that, although the Court of Chancery may—and typically does— condition Section 220 inspections on the entry of a reasonable confidentiality order, such inspections are not subject to a presumption of confidentiality. We further hold that when the court, in the exercise of its discretion, enters a confidentiality order, the order’s temporal duration is not dependent on a showing of the absence of exigent circumstances by the stockholder. Rather, the Court of Chancery should weigh the stockholder’s legitimate interests in free communication against the corporation’s legitimate interests in confidentiality.

Slip op., at 2-3.

Key Takeaway:

Given the importance that the Delaware Supreme Court has placed on making Section 220 demands prior to asserting a shareholder derivative action, parties to Section 220 actions should take note of this decision and consider carefully the necessity of imposing a confidentiality agreement in connection with a Section 220 inspection.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  Carl is admitted in the State of Delaware and regularly practices before the Delaware Court of Chancery, with an emphasis on shareholder disputes. You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

On May 31, 2019, the Court of Chancery issued a 57-page memorandum opinion ordering Facebook Inc. to provide certain corporate books and records to various plaintiff investors, in the case of In re Facebook Inc. Section 220 Litigation, Consol. C.A. No. 2018-0661-JRS (Del. Ch. May 31, 2019), in a dispute filed under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”).

Plaintiffs’ books and records demand was brought following “one of the sharpest single-day market value declines in history when [Facebook’s] stock price dropped 19%, wiping out approximately $120 billion of shareholder wealth.”  Slip op. at 1.  Such drop in value occurred following news reports that in 2015, the private data of 50 million Facebook users had been poached by Cambridge Analytica, a British political consulting firm.  The Court noted that Facebook did not disclose this security breach to its users upon discovery or at any time thereafter, leaving users to first learn of the breach in the news.

Vice Chancellor Slights also noted that the Cambridge Analytica breach occurred at a time when Facebook was subject to a Consent Decree entered by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) in 2011, “after the FTC found that Facebook’s data privacy measures were not protecting users’ private information.” Id.  The Consent Decree required Facebook to implement “more robust and verifiable data security protocols.”  Id.  Per the memorandum opinion, at the time of the news reports of the breach, additional news reports indicated that Facebook’s business model included incentives to monetize user data without their consent.

Following the above-referenced news reports, multiple investors served Section 220 books and records demands upon Facebook.  Among other things, the investors sought inspection to investigate mismanagement and wrongdoing of the Facebook board. In response, the company produced approximately 1,700 heavily redacted pages covering a portion of the requested time period.  Vice Chancellor Slights consolidated the demands and held a one-day trial on March 7, 2019.

Facebook defended on the grounds that the requests lacked the requisite precision as they are not limited to documents “necessary, essential and sufficient to the stockholder’s purpose.” Id. at 37. Facebook also asserted that if plaintiffs sought to investigate a potential Caremark claim, the Demand Letter failed to provide any evidence that Facebook “utterly failed to implement a reporting system or ignored red flags”, citing Beatrice Corwin Living Irrevocable Tr. v. Pfizer, Inc., 2016 WL 4548101, at *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2016).  In addition, Facebook complained that the demands were a moving target and that plaintiffs’ counsel demanded more documents in a larger time period than originally listed in their demand letters.

While acknowledging that plaintiffs had “reshaped” their demands, Vice Chancellor Slights found that plaintiffs satisfied their low burden, noting that the “credible basis” standard in Section 220 actions “imposes the lowest burden of proof known in our law[.]”  Id. at 4. Moreover, while the Court noted that a Caremark claim “’is possibly the most difficult theory upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment,’ that admonition does not license this court to alter the minimum burden of proof governing a stockholder’s qualified right to inspect books and records.” Id. (citing In re Caremark Int’l Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)).

Further, the Court found of significance the fact that the FTC Consent Order was in place at the time of the purported breach, noting that Delaware Courts “are more inclined to find Caremark oversight liability at the board level when the company operates in the midst of obligations imposed upon it by positive law yet fails to implement compliance systems, or fails to monitor existing compliance systems, such that a violation of law and resulting liability occurs.” Slip op. at 41.

Given that plaintiffs met their low burden to establish a credible basis to infer mismanagement and wrongdoing, the Court ordered inspection of certain of the demanded categories of documents, while finding that plaintiffs did not act in bad faith by expanding or contracting their demands during the Section 220 litigation, and expanding the time period of requested documents first from February 2017 to the present, to 2011 to the present.

However, the Court found that many of plaintiffs’ document demands “landed with the precision of buckshot”, and thus Vice Chancellor Slights tailored the inspection award to the purposes articulated in their demand.  In addition, the Court found that documents dating back to 2011 would be too broad, while noting that claims dating back to 2011 would likely be time-barred.  Accordingly, the Court limited the time period from February 2017 to the present, consistent with the time period of requested documents set forth in plaintiffs’ original demand letter made upon Facebook.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  Carl is admitted in the State of Delaware and regularly practices before the Delaware Court of Chancery, with an emphasis on shareholder disputes. You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

In the recent Delaware Supreme Court decision of Leaf Invenergy Co. v. Invenergy Renewables, LLC, No. 308, 2018 (Del. May 3, 2019), the High Court found that a nominal damages award of $1 by the Court of Chancery in a suit over a multi-billion dollar sale of a portion of  defendant/appellee Invenergy Wind LLC (“Invenergy”), a wind farm developer, should be reversed because the sale violated the consent rights of the plaintiff/appellant investor, Leaf Invenergy Co. (“Leaf”), warranting $126 million in damages.

The High Court found that Leaf had previously negotiated consent rights when investing $30 million into Invenergy, which required the investor’s permission in advance of any material sale.  Per the opinion, the relevant contract provision reflected each side’s intention to either move forward with a such a sale only with Leaf’s consent, or to require Invenergy to buy out Leaf if it did not consent to the transaction.  When the Court of Chancery determined that those rights had been breached, it should have upheld contractual provisions calling for a damages multiplier, per the Supreme Court.

Instead, Vice Chancellor Laster held that an “efficient breach” had occurred, because even though Invenergy did not seek Leaf’s consent prior to the sale, the trial court found that Leaf received more in the sale than it would have under the contract terms.  Vice Chancellor Laster thus decided on the $1 nominal damages award because he determined that Leaf was left no worse off despite the breaches, in light of the efficient breach doctrine.

When assessing damages, the High Court found that the Court of Chancery erred by limiting its focus on the harm to Leaf in the context of the results of the sale, rather than considering the full effect of Invenergy’s contractual breach in failing to seek Leaf’s consent and then failing to pay the target multiple.  The Supreme Court stated held the trial court should have taken a broader approach that “considered the combination of [all aspects of the contractual breaches] when assessing what injury Leaf suffered from Invenergy’s breach and thus what amount of damages would return Leaf to the position it would have been in had Invenergy not breached [the contract]”.  Slip op. at 28.

Accordingly, the Delaware Supreme Court found that Leaf was entitled to a payment of the contractual multiple given that it never provided its consent to the sale.  As a result, it reversed Chancery’s award of nominal damages and awarded Leaf $126 million in damages.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  Carl is admitted in the State of Delaware and regularly practices before the Delaware Court of Chancery, with an emphasis on shareholder disputes. You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

In a recent opinion issued by the Delaware Court of Chancery, Freeman Family LLC v. Park Avenue Landing LLC, C.A. No. 2018-0683-TMR (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2019), Vice Chancellor Montgomery-Reeves granted advancement to a member of a Delaware LLC.  In the case, plaintiff Freeman Family LLC (“Plaintiff”), a member of defendant Park Avenue Landing LLC (“LLC” or “Defendant”), requested advancement under the terms of the LLC’s operating agreement.  The operating agreement provides that members shall receive advancement if they are made party to an action by reason of their status as a member.  Plaintiff, a member of the LLC, is defending a federal lawsuit in New Jersey brought by the LLC’s managing member, relating to the Plaintiff’s call right under the operating agreement.

After Defendant answered the complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 12(c), and Defendant followed with its own cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings.  As a preliminary note, the Court observed that “[a]dvancement cases are particularly appropriate for resolution on a paper record, as they principally involve the question of whether claims pled in a complaint against a party . . . trigger a right to advancement under the terms of a corporate instrument.” Slip op. at 7 (citing DeLucca v. KKAT Mgmt., LLC, 2006 WL 224058, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 23, 2006)).

Turning to the substance of the dispute, the Court noted that the cross-motions at issue center on the interpretation of the LLC’s operating agreement.  In addition, the Court also found that corporate case law, interpreting D&O’s rights to advancement from a Delaware corporation under Section 145 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”), applied to the Court’s analysis.  This is because the language in the advancement provision of the LLC’s operating agreement was substantially similar to the language of 8 Del. C. § 145.

Under Section 145 of the DGCL, claims for indemnification or advancement by a director or officer of a corporation must relate to lawsuits or proceedings “by reason of the fact” that such person was or is serving in such capacity.   The Court examined Delaware case law in the corporate context addressing whether suit is brought against a party “by reason of the fact” that the party was acting in an official capacity on behalf of the company.  Vice Chancellor Montgomery-Reeves noted that under Delaware case law, the “by reason of the fact” standard is broadly interpreted, “requir[ing] a causal relationship between the official capacity and the lawsuit.” Slip op. at 18.

In this action, the Court held that the underlying action implicated Plaintiff’s performance of its official duties under the operating agreement.  Accordingly, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings granting Plaintiff advancement, and denied Defendant’s cross-motion.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  Carl is admitted in the State of Delaware and regularly practices before the Delaware Court of Chancery, with an emphasis on shareholder disputes. You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.