In the recent Delaware Supreme Court decision of CompoSecure LLC v. Cardux LLC, C.A. No. 177, 2018 (Del. Nov. 7, 2018), the High Court  found that a contract may be rendered void because it did not comply with the requirements set forth in an LLC agreement formed by the parties to the contract for the purposes of entering into such contract.  Although the findings of the Court of Chancery were largely affirmed, the Supreme Court remanded the action to Vice Chancellor Laster of the Court of Chancery to review a discrete but significant issue overlooked by the trial court, as discussed below.

Appellant CompoSecure, LLC, appealed an approximately $17 million judgment obtained in the Delaware Court of Chancery for past-due commissions, legal fees and expenses, pre-judgment interest, and contract damages arising out of a sales agreement with Appellee CardUX, LLC.  CompoSecure asserted on appeal that the trial court erred in holding that: (i) the Sales Agreement was not void, but rather voidable, under the LLC agreement entered among the parties, and (ii) the Sales Agreement was impliedly ratified by Appellant.  In response, CardUX argued that, notwithstanding Appellant’s arguments, the Sales Agreement should be enforced based on a provision in the LLC agreement that addresses reliance by third parties on certain company actions, or based upon the doctrine of quantum meruit.

The Supreme Court largely agreed with the Court of Chancery’s conclusions that: (i) the Related Party Provision (leaving aside the Restricted Activities Provision) rendered the Sales Agreement not void, but rather voidable, and was therefore subject to equitable defenses, (ii) the parties impliedly ratified the Sales Agreement under the law of New Jersey, and (iii) the Third Party Reliance Provision did not save the Sales Agreement from failure to comply with the Related Party or Restricted Activities Provisions.

However, the Delaware Supreme Court determined that Vice Chancellor Laster should have separately considered whether the Sales Agreement falls within the Restricted Activities Provision, and did not analyze whether the Sales Agreement was “void and of no force or effect whatsoever” in the event it did apply.  Per the Supreme Court, “[t]he answer to this question is important because, if the Restricted Activities Provision applies, the Sales Agreement would be void, as opposed to merely voidable, and, therefore, would be incapable of being ratified.” Slip op. at 4.

Of interest for practitioners, the Supreme Court noted that plaintiff/appellant CompoSecure LLC (“CompoSecure”) “only weakly raised the issue below, but, on appeal, elevates the issue to its lead argument.”  (Slip op. at 3-4.)  That said, the Supreme Court found that the argument had not been waived. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings as to this particular issue held to have been overlooked by the lower court.

This decision is significant to drafters of limited liability company agreements.  The terms of such agreement should be carefully considered before entering into a contract among the parties to such agreement.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  Carl is admitted in the State of Delaware and regularly practices before the Delaware Court of Chancery, with an emphasis on shareholder disputes. You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

In Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., No. 101, 2018, (Del. Oct. 9, 2018), the Delaware Supreme Court held that a controlling stockholder who pursues a merger with the company under its control will have the benefit of the business judgment review standard pursuant to Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (“MFW”), so long as the requisite protections under MFW are put in place prior to the start of negotiations between the purchaser and seller.

In MFW, the Supreme Court held that, in a landmark decision, freezeout mergers structured with various inherent protections should be reviewed under the highly deferential business judgment standard.  In order to benefit from the business judgment rule, the transaction must be conditioned, at the start, upon the following: (1) the approval of an independent, adequately-empowered special committee of the board of directors that fulfills its duty of care, and (2) the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders (the “MFW protections”).

The dispute in Synutra arose over when the MFW protections will be deemed to have been in place “ab initio.”  Appellants argued the Court of Chancery misapplied the MFW standard, claiming the business judgment rule should not apply because the initial proposal did not contain the MFW protections and therefore could not be considered to have been in place from the beginning.  The High Court majority disagreed, explaining the MFW ab initio requirement is satisfied if the controller conditions the buyout on the MFW protections at the beginning of the deal process and before economic negotiations commence.

The Supreme Court therefore concluded that the interpretation of MFW standard based on the foregoing principles was correct, citing its previous affirmance in Swomley v. Schlecht, 128 A.3d 992 (Del. 2015).

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  Carl is admitted in the State of Delaware and regularly practices before the Delaware Court of Chancery, with an emphasis on shareholder disputes. You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

In the recent decision of In re PLX Technology, Inc. S’holders Litig., Consl. C.A. No. 9880-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery found that shareholders of PLX Technology Inc. (“PLX”), a semiconductor firm, failed to prove that breaches of fiduciary duty by its directors caused any damages.

The shareholders brought the suit after PLX announced the proposed sale to a competitor, Avago Technologies Wireless Manufacturing Inc. (“Avago”) at a price of $6.50 per share.  The complaint alleged that the sale process was flawed, stating that Potomac Capital Partners LP (“Potomac”), a 10% shareholder of PLX, pushed for a quick sale that undervalued the company, at a time when PLX was on the cusp of significant improvement.

The claims against two directors of PLX and Avago were previously dismissed, and a settlement was reached with the remaining director defendants before trial. The aiding and abetting claims against Potomac were the remaining claims left to be decided in the instant opinion.

In a lengthy opinion, Vice Chancellor Laster found that while PLX shareholders showed that the company’s directors breached their duty in approving a sale to a competitor in 2015, Potomac did not aid and abet those breaches of fiduciary duties even though it pushed for the deal while not providing transparent information to other investors.

Regarding damages, Vice Chancellor Laster said that the financial projections relied upon by the shareholders’ valuation expert to demonstrate the company was worth $9.82 per share were aggressive and unlikely to be realized, because they anticipated significant revenues from a product line (not yet in existence) that would require PLX to enter a new market.  In addition, PLX had a history of missing its projections.  Citing the Delaware Supreme Court Dell decision, the opinion stated that “The Delaware Supreme Court has cautioned that “[m]anagement’s history of missing its forecasts should . . . give[] the Court of Chancery pause.”  Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 27, n. 129 (Del. 2017).

In relying upon deal price, the opinion cited to recent Delaware Supreme Court rulings, including Dell and DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value P’rs., 172 A.3d 346, 362 (Del. 2017), that give significant weight to deal price in an appraisal actions.  Because the Court found that PLX conducted an extensive marketing process both before and after the offer received from Avago that satisfied the High Court’s requirements, plaintiff stockholders were unable to demonstrate damages.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  Carl is admitted in the State of Delaware and regularly practices before the Delaware Court of Chancery, with an emphasis on shareholder disputes. You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

Recently, Governor John Carney nominated Morgan Zurn and Kathaleen McCormick to serve as Vice Chancellors for the Delaware Court of Chancery.  The number of jurists on the Court of Chancery was recently increased by two.  Morgan Zurn presently serves as a Master for the Court of Chancery.  Prior to joining the Court of Chancery, Master Zurn worked as a Deputy Attorney General in the Delaware Department of Justice, in the Consumer Protection Unit.  Kathaleen McCormick is a corporate litigation attorney in Delaware, with a focus on corporate, commercial and alternative entity litigation in the Court of Chancery.  The Delaware Senate plans to consider the nominations during a special session on October 3rd.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  Carl is admitted in the State of Delaware and regularly practices before the Delaware Court of Chancery, with an emphasis on shareholder disputes. You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

Often times in appraisal litigation, the Court of Chancery must make a determination as to whether admit evidence implicating events transpiring after the signing of the merger.  This issue was addressed in the recent decision of In re Appraisal of Jarden Corporation, C.A. No. 12456-VCS (Del. Ch. Sept. 7, 2018).  There, documents relating to Jarden’s post-signing financial performance were at dispute, and the Court directed the parties to address the objections to the same in post-trial briefing.  This decision reflects that the Court will in certain instances entertain post-signing evidence into the record when adjudicating a Section 262 appraisal action.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  Carl is admitted in the State of Delaware and regularly practices before the Delaware Court of Chancery, with an emphasis on shareholder disputes. You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

In the recent decision of Trascent Management Consulting, Inc. v. Bouri, C.A. No. 10915-VCMR (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery rescinded an operating agreement of a Delaware limited liability company.  In the 75-page opinion, Vice Chancellor Montgomery Reeves found that defendant George Bouri fraudulently induced the formation of the limited liability company and his employment agreement.  In addition, the Court found that defendant also made false statements during the litigation.

In so ruling, the Court held that Bouri lied in order to induce Trascent to hire him and to give him an equity position in the company, lied about his prior employment experience at Time Warner, and lied about his prior title, salary, and bonus structure.  Bouri had falsely claimed that he voluntarily resigned from Time Warner.  As a result of Bouri’s fraud, the Court rescinded Bouri’s employment agreement and declared the Trascent operating agreement unenforceable by Bouri.

To remedy the misconduct, the Court rescinded the employment agreement and declared the operating agreement unenforceable.  The court also awarded attorneys’ fees and costs as a penalty for defendant’s litigation misconduct, specifically awarding Trascent its attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in bringing the motion for sanctions and 40% of all fees Trascent incurred throughout the litigation.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  Carl is admitted in the State of Delaware and regularly practices before the Delaware Court of Chancery, with an emphasis on shareholder disputes. You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

In the recent decision of CapStack Nashville 3 LLC, et al. v. MACC Venture Partners, et al., C.A. No. 2018-0552-SG (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery declined to enter a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) which would amount to a prior restraint of speech.  Plaintiffs sought a TRO to temporarily enjoin the Defendants from making allegedly defamatory statements about the Plaintiffs to the SEC, investors or other third parties.

The Court recited the well-known standard of a TRO, which requires the moving party to demonstrate: (1) a colorable claim, (2) a likelihood of imminent, irreparable harm if relief is not granted, and (3) that movant will suffer greater hardships if the TRO is not granted than the defendants would suffer if the relief were granted.

The Court found that “Plaintiffs’ request runs afoul of the ‘traditional maxim that equity will not enjoin a libel.'”  Slip op. at 9 (citing Organovo Holdings, Inc. v. Dimitrov, 162 A.3d 115 (Del. Ch. 2017)).  The Court further noted that “[w]hen an injunction against speech is entered before a full trial on the merits, “’it is almost always treated as an unconstitutional prior restraint.’” Slip op. at 10 (citing Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147, 171 (1998)).  Accordingly, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for TRO.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  Carl is admitted in the State of Delaware and regularly practices before the Delaware Court of Chancery, with an emphasis on shareholder disputes. You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

The recent decision of ChyronHego Corporation v. Wight, C.A. No. 2017-0548-SG (Del. Ch. July 31, 2018), provides helpful guidance regarding the effectiveness of anti-reliance provisions in a contract.

ChyronHego clarifies that in order for the anti-reliance provision to be effective under Delaware law,

[T]he contract must contain language that, when read together, can be said to add up to a clear anti-reliance clause by which the plaintiff has contractually promised that it did not rely upon statements outside the contract’s four corners in deciding to sign the contract.

Slip op. at 12.  On the other hand, the Court clarified that Standard Integration Clauses without explicit anti-reliance representations, will not relieve a party of its extra-contractual fraudulent representations. Id.

Here, plaintiffs asserted claims of fraud arising from a corporate acquisition, alleging that defendants fraudulently misrepresented the actual condition and value of the company.  Vice Chancellor Glasscock found that the stock purchase agreement (“SPA”) at issue unambiguously barred prior extra-contractual fraud.  This was so given the unambiguous anti-reliance provision contained in the SPA, together with the SPA’s integration clause, exclusive remedies clause, a clause defining excluded liabilities, and an indemnification provision.

As such, the Court dismissed those claims in the complaint alleging extra-contractual fraud in connection with the SPA.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  Carl is admitted in the State of Delaware and regularly practices before the Delaware Court of Chancery, with an emphasis on shareholder disputes. You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

The highly publicized Dell and DFC Global appraisal opinions issued by the Delaware Supreme Court in 2017 inform that where a company is sold in a clean M&A auction process, with information sufficiently disseminated to potential bidders, the merger price will be given significant weight, leaving it to the trial court to decide just how much weight that should be in this case.  For a review of prior blog posts addressing the Dell and DFC Global decisions, click here and here, respectively.

Since Dell and DFC Global, several Court of Chancery opinions have considered whether to give significant weight to merger price in determining fair value.  These decisions include In re Appraisal of AOL Inc., C.A. No. 11204-VCG (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2018), and Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks Inc.  In the former, Vice Chancellor Glasscock found that the sales process was not “Dell-compliant”, and thus assigned no weight to the deal price.  The latter went the other way, finding that the sales process was sufficiently adequate.

In the recent decision of Blueblade Capital Opportunities v. Norcraft Company, Inc., C.A. No. 11184-VCS (Del. Ch. July 27, 2018), Vice Chancellor Slights found that “the evidence reveals significant flaws in the process leading to the Merger that undermine the reliability of the Merger Price as an indicator of Norcraft’s value.” Slip op. at 3. This is so because the Court found that there was no pre-signing market check, that Norcraft and its advisors “fixated on Norcraft and never broadened their view to other potential partners”, and that Norcraft’s lead negotiator “was at least as focused on securing benefits for himself as he was on securing the best price available for Norcraft.” Id. 

Accordingly, the Court declined to rely upon deal price, but instead determined fair value by turning to the discounted cash low analysis presented by the parties, and “borrowed the most credible components of each expert’s analysis to conduct [the Court’s] own DCF valuation”.  In so doing, the Court’s DCF valuation yielded a fair value of $26.16 a share, up slightly from the deal price at $25.50 a share.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  Carl is admitted in the State of Delaware and regularly practices before the Delaware Court of Chancery, with an emphasis on shareholder disputes. You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

On July 18, 2018, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an Order to improve attorney work life balance.  The Order requires that each state court in Delaware amend their rules to set forth a 5:00 p.m. ET electronic filing deadline for the majority of filings.  To read an announcement from the Delaware Supreme Court discussing the Order, click here.  [Note: This follows a similar rule by the U.S. District Court of the District of Delaware, which set a filing cutoff of 6:00 p.m. ET.]

The 5:00 p.m. ET filing deadline will apply to all electronic filings in non-expedited cases, except for initial pleadings and notices of appeal.  Expedited cases are not subject to this rule.  The filing deadline will become effective on September 14, 2018.

The Order also recommends that Delaware state courts adopt rules discouraging filing deadlines on Mondays or immediately following a holiday, the issuance of non-expedited opinions after 4:00 p.m. generally or on a Friday afternoon, and the scheduling of oral argument or trials in August, except for expedited matters or where there is an important reason for proceeding at that time.

Carl D. Neff is a lawyer with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  Carl is admitted in the State of Delaware and regularly practices before the Delaware Court of Chancery, with an emphasis on shareholder disputes.  You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.